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CRIMINAL PROCEDURE:
PRETRIAL, TRIAL, AND APPEAL
Kerry P. FitzGerald*
HIS article will review many of the significant decisions of the
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. There appears to be a trend
toward split decisions and a consistent effort by the court to decide
the case on the merits if an error has been substantially preserved.
I. BAIL HEARING-CROSS-EXAMINATION OF DEFENDANT
In Homan v. State,1 the court ultimately found improvident its decision
to grant review in a case involving the questioning of the defendant dur-
ing a bail hearing, primarily because while the case was under review, the
defendant was actually convicted of capital murder and sentenced to life
imprisonment. While the nature of the decision does not afford the case
any precedential value, it is interesting to note that the court quoted lan-
guage in the court of appeals decision to the effect that "[a] defendant
may testify in a bail hearing regarding his ability to make bail without
subjecting himself to cross-examination on the nature and circumstances
of the offense with which he is charged."'2 In other words, a three para-
graph opinion clearly telegraphed the court's concern that such an issue
be put to rest in future cases.
II. DISMISSAL
In State v. Terrazas,3 the defendant was indicted for tampering with a
governmental record, specifically an application for assistance from the
Texas Department of Human Services (DHS). The defendant com-
plained of the violation of her due process rights and of her due course of
law rights because the District Attorney's Office was compensated by
DHS for accepting cases submitted by DHS for prosecution in violation
of Texas Government Code section 41.004. Section 41.004 provides that
[a] district or county attorney, either before or after the case is tried
and finally determined, may not take from any person a fee, article
of value, compensation, reward, or gift, or a promise of any of these,
to prosecute or as consideration or a testimonial for his services in a
* Kerry P. FitzGerald, Attorney at Law, Dallas, Texas. B.A., Southern Methodist
University, 1963; L.L.B., University of Texas Law School, 1966.
1. 962 S.W.2d 599 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
2. Id. at 600.
3. 962 S.W.2d 38 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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case that he is required by law to prosecute. 4
The defendant also contended her statement to a welfare fraud investiga-
tor was not voluntarily made. After a hearing, the trial court dismissed
the indictment with prejudice and suppressed the defendant's statement.
The court of appeals reversed both orders. 5 The evidence at the hearing
showed that the District Attorney's Office and DHS entered into a con-
tract by which the D.A.'s office would receive about $433 for each re-
ferred case that resulted in deferred adjudication, a conviction or an
acquittal, but no money was paid for a dismissal. The case load increased
remarkably over the course of the contract.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the court of appeals erred in
remedying a trial court's authority to dismiss a charging instrument to
four situations.6 The court also held that a dismissal of the criminal
charges may be proper when "a defendant suffers demonstrable preju-
dice, or a substantial threat thereof, and where the trial court is unable to
identify and neutralize the taint by other means."' 7 Because the court of
appeals held that the trial court was not authorized to dismiss the indict-
ment for a due process violation, it never reached the question of whether
the defendant was denied her rights to due process and to due course of
law. The court of appeals should have an opportunity to render a deci-
sion on the merits. The court emphasized that in the event it is found that
the defendant's rights to due process and to due course of law were vio-
lated, and dismissal of the indictment was the appropriate means to neu-
tralize the taint of the constitutional violation, the trial court did not
abuse its discretion. However, if there was not a constitutional violation
or if the defendant's rights were violated, but dismissal of the indictment
was not necessary to neutralize the taint of the unconstitutional action,
the trial court did abuse its discretion. The case was remanded to the
court of appeals for further proceedings.
It is clear from the opinion that the Court of Criminal Appeals was
concerned about the imposition of certain restrictions on its powers. The
decision laid to rest the notion that the court would be unduly restrained
given a compelling set of circumstances. 8
4. Terrazas, 962 S.W.2d at 38 n.1.
5. State v. Terrazas, 933 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, pet. granted).
6. "The Court of Appeals... observed that a trial court is [only] authorized to dis-
miss an indictment with prejudice (1) for a defect of form or substance; (2) for the denial of
the constitutional right to a speedy trial; (3) under Article 32.01 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure when a person is detained and no charging instrument is properly presented;
and (4) if prosecutorial misconduct prejudicially violates a defendant's right to counsel,
and the exclusion of the evidence will not cure the prejudice." Terrazas, 962 S.W.2d at 39.
7. Id. at 41.
8. The court stated:
The judicial power of this State is vested in the courts created by the Texas
Constitution. Tex. Const. art. V, § 1. Although we will not explore the
boundaries of "judicial power" in this opinion, judicial power certainly in-
cludes the power to enforce the constitutions and laws of the United States
and the State of Texas. To enforce and protect constitutional rights, courts
must have authority to fashion appropriate remedies for violations of consti-
tutional rights. The only questions in such cases are whether there was a
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III. COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
In State v. Brabson,9 the defendant challenged his criminal prosecution
for DWI based upon the doctrine of collateral estoppel. At the adminis-
trative proceeding to revoke the defendant's license, the administrative
judge found no probable cause for the defendant's arrest. Therefore, the
defendant argued at the motion to suppress hearing and at the DWI case
that the issue of probable cause for arrest had been decided adversely to
the State and, thus, the State was precluded from criminally prosecuting
the defendant.
The Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that in criminal cases the
federal law doctrine of "administrative collateral estoppel" applied.' 0
The doctrine stated that "[wihen an administrative agency is acting in a
judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of [ultimate] fact properly
before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate,
the courts have not hesitated to apply res judicata to enforce repose."11
Initially, the court found that the parties, which had to be the same in
each proceeding, were not, because the Texas Department of Public
Safety and the Dallas County District Attorney's Office are not the same
parties. Therefore, the collateral estoppel principles do not preclude the
District Attorney from litigating the issue of probable cause for the de-
fendant's arrest at the suppression hearing in the criminal prosecution. In
other contexts, such as Brady, challenges claiming non-disclosure to the
defendant of exculpatory evidence, the District Attorney and law en-
forcement agencies have been held to be the same parties for analytical
purposes. A different principle applies in the application of a collateral
estoppel doctrine because a party should have an opportunity to litigate
an ultimate issue of fact.
Even assuming that the Texas Department of Public Safety and the
District Attorney were the same parties (i.e., the "State"), the court ob-
served that the administrative judge was only authorized to make three
findings12 and that the applicable law did not authorize the administrative
constitutional violation and what is the appropriate remedy. Elected judges
must swear or affirm that they will preserve, protect, and defend the United
States Constitution and the Texas Constitution. Tex. Const. Art. XVI, § 1. It
would make no sense to provide for a constitutional right; require judges to
preserve, protect, and defend that constitutional right; but prohibit judges
from enforcing that constitutional right and from remedying a violation of
that constitutional right.
Id. at 40 n.2. See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393 (1914) (if a remedy for the
violation of a constitutional right is not provided, that right might as well be stricken from
the Constitution). Constitutional rights are not simply grandiose, advisory principles.
They are the foundation upon which our system of the orderly administration of justice is
structured. See id.
9. 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
10. Id. at 183.
11. Id. at 183-84 (emphasis added).
12. (1) [Wjhether probable cause existed that such person was driving or in
actual physical control of a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated,(2) whether the person was placed under arrest by the officer and was of-
fered an opportunity to give a specimen under the provisions of the Act, and
1999]
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judge to make a finding on the issue of probable cause for arrest and did
not place the State on notice that such an issue may be litigated in the
administrative hearing. The question of whether probable cause existed
that the defendant operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated was a dif-
ferent question from whether probable cause existed for his arrest. Thus,
it could not be said that the issue of probable cause for the defendant's
arrest was "properly before" the administrative judge or that the State
had an adequate opportunity to litigate the issue at the administrative
proceeding. In addition, the court emphasized that the exclusionary rule
applied only in criminal trials and not at administrative proceedings. 13
IV. DOUBLE JEOPARDY
In Ex parte Mitchell,'4 the defendant was convicted of a capital murder
alleged to have been committed on or about December 26, 1979. His
conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. The defendant sought post-
conviction relief by filing an Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus, al-
leging that the State had withheld material exculpatory evidence, thereby
denying his rights to due process and to due course of law. Relief was
granted.' 5 After the defendant's case was set for retrial, he filed a Peti-
tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging that the State's prosecution of
him for capital murder would violate his double jeopardy rights under
both the United States Constitution and the Texas Constitution "due to
the intentional [or reckless] prosecutorial misconduct that formed the ba-
sis of this Court's reversal of applicant's prior conviction."'16 In Mitchell I,
the court found that the State suppressed material exculpatory evidence
that could have been used to impeach its accomplice witness, and which
undermined confidence in the verdict. The suppressed evidence con-
sisted of statements by game warden Ralph East and Smith County Dep-
uty Sheriff Kelly Stroud. East and Stroud, in their statements, said they
observed the victim alive 17 sometime around midnight at the fireworks
stand where he worked. The indictment alleged that the victim was killed
during a robbery of the fireworks stand. Two accomplice witnesses testi-
fied that the defendant shot and killed the victim at 8:30 p.m., and this
testimony was not corroborated as to the time of the killing. East and
Stroud did not speak to the victim but concluded the victim was alive
(3) whether such person refused to give a specimen upon the request of the
officer.
Id. at 184-85.
13. This opinion did not conflict with the court's holding in Ex parte Tarver, 725
S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc), a case in which the court held that the
parties were the same and that the ultimate fact issue in the probation revocation proceed-
ing and the subsequent criminal prosecution was the same. The ultimate fact issue was
decided adversely to the State in the probation revocation proceeding, and that fact issue
was properly before the trial court in the probation revocation proceeding.
14. 977 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc) [hereinafter Mitchell Il].
15. Ex parte Mitchell, 853 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (en banc) [hereinafter
Mitchell I].
16. Mitchell II, 977 S.W.2d at 577.
17. See id. (stating that the victim was alive "as far as they could tell").
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based upon their seeing the victim sitting in front of a television at the
fireworks stand as they drove by around midnight. At trial, East alone
was called as a witness but was never asked anything about this time
frame.
At the 1989 hearing held pursuant to the writ application which re-
sulted in Mitchell I, the court stated that it appeared that the existence of
East's and Stroud's statements, which were in the possession of the Sher-
iff's Department, were not known to the Smith County District Attor-
ney's Office. These statements, however, were concealed by the Sheriff's
Department according to the court. But at the writ hearing heard pursu-
ant to the present writ application in July of 1996, it was revealed that the
lead prosecutor at the defendant's 1981 trial did have knowledge of East's
observations at the time of trial. The lead prosecutor's hand written
notes referred to East's observations. Thus, both the Sheriff's Depart-
ment and the District Attorney's Office were aware of the exculpatory
statement.
The court initially reviewed the well established rules with regard to a
prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory evidencei' 8
The court noted that the significant cases in this area consistently found
reversal and remanding for further proceedings to be the proper remedy
when the first trial was unconstitutionally tainted by prosecutorial mis-
conduct.19 Generally, a retrial is barred on jeopardy grounds only if there
is insufficient evidence to support the conviction. "The Supreme Court
has held that where the State has in bad faith destroyed evidence
favorable to the [defendant], retrial of the [defendant] may be barred if
the [defendant's] due process rights are violated. °20 The Supreme Court,
however, left open the question of whether, in any instance, retrial would
be jeopardy barred.
The Mitchell H court then recognized and distinguished the situation
presented in Oregon v. Kennedy,2' wherein the Supreme Court held that
"the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment [was] not offended
by a second prosecution for the same offense where the earlier proceed-
ing was terminated as a result of the defendant's motion for mistrial un-
less the State deliberately set out to provoke the defendant's motion for
18. The State has an affirmative duty to make available to an accused, in a timely
manner, exculpatory evidence which is in its possession. Suppression by the State violates
due process irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. See Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The Brady rule was extended to incorporate the required
revelation to a defendant of material exculpatory evidence in the possession of police
agencies and other parts of the "prosecutorial team." See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419
(1995). "Evidence whose value is limited to that of impeachment must also be divulged to
the defendant if the failure to do so by the State undermined confidence in the trial's
outcome." United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
19. See Exparte Davis, 957 S.W.2d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc); Cook v. State,
940 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc); Ex parte Adams, 768 S.W.2d 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Ex parte Brandley, 781 S.W.2d 886 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en
banc).
20. Mitchell II, 977 S.W.2d at 578 (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988)).
21. 456 U.S. 667 (1982).
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mistrial, thereby violating the defendant's right under the double jeop-
ardy clause to have his trial decided by the first tribunal. '22 The court
emphasized that the "granting of the motion for mistrial terminates the
proceeding; the defendant's subsequent prosecution is a new proceeding.
A retrial following a reversal, in contrast, is one uninterrupted proceed-
ing."'23 The court stated that the defendant's right under the double jeop-
ardy clause to have his trial completed by the first tribunal was "clearly
protected where, as in the present case, it proceeded to conclusion, i.e., a
verdict. ' 24 Thus, the court held that the defendant's double jeopardy
rights under the United States Constitution were not violated. 25 Further,
the court recognized that under the Texas Constitution, a retrial would be
jeopardy-barred, not only where the State deliberately provoked the de-
fendant's motion for mistrial (and such motion was granted), but also
where the defendant's motion for mistrial was due to reckless behavior
on the part of the State.26
In Ex parte Bauder,27 the defendant's second DWI trial ended in a mis-
trial after the prosecutor developed testimony from the arresting officer
that, immediately before the defendant's arrest, the defendant was en-
gaged in extraneous misconduct. The defendant filed a pre-trial applica-
tion for Writ of Habeas Corpus prior to the third trial, arguing that
further prosecution violated double jeopardy. The Habeas Court found
the prosecutor deliberately elicited evidence from the arresting officer at
the second trial for the purpose of prejudicing the defendant unfairly
before the jury, but denied relief on the ground that the defendant sought
the mistrial and because it did not appear that the prosecutor elicited the
objectionable testimony for the purpose of goading the defendant into
seeking a mistrial. The fourth court of appeals affirmed.28
The Court of Criminal Appeals observed that a subsequent prosecution
may be jeopardy barred after declaration of a mistrial if the objectionable
conduct of the prosecutor was intended to induce a motion for a mistrial
or if the prosecuting attorney "was aware but consciously disregarded the
risk that an objectionable event for which he was responsible would re-
quire a mistrial at the defendant's request. ' 29 Trial conditions "must be
22. Id. at 579.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 579-80.
25. Id. at 580.
26. See Bauder v. State, 921 S.W.2d 696 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (en banc). In Mitchell
II, as in Ex parte Davis, 775 S.W.2d 649 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989), the court refused to extend
the Bauder rule to a situation in which prosecutorial misconduct led to a reversal and
subsequent reprosecution. The court also observed that the defendant had not demon-
strated the existence of pervasive prosecutorial misconduct or of intentional prosecutorial
actions that were designed to deprive him of a fair trial. See Mitchell I1, 977 S.W.2d at 580-
81. See State v. Breit, 122 N.M. 655, 930 P.2d 792 (1996); State v. White, 85 N.C. App. 81,
354 S.E.2d 324, 329 (1987), aff'd, 322 N.C. 506, 369 S.E.2d 813 (1988); Commonwealth v.
Smith, 532 Pa. 177, 615 A.2d 321 (1992).
27. 974 S.W.2d 729 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en bane).
28. Bauder v. State, 880 S.W.2d 502, 504 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, pet. granted).
29. Bauder v. State, 936 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1996, pet. granted).
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extreme" before a mistrial is warranted under Texas law. A prosecutor
will not be accountable, and a subsequent prosecution will not be barred
by jeopardy, when the court need not have granted the defendant's mo-
tion for mistrial. On remand, the court of appeals concluded that the trial
court need not have granted the defendant's motion for mistrial and,
thus, the subsequent trial was not jeopardy barred.30 The Court of Crimi-
nal Appeals emphasized that the real question was not the correctness of
the trial court's ruling granting the mistrial but, rather, was whether the
defendant truly consented to the mistrial. The court noted that most mo-
tions for mistrial are with the defendant's consent. The court stated that
the real issues were (1) whether the defendant's motion for mistrial was a
choice he made in response to ordinary reversible error in order to avoid
conviction, appeal, reversal, and retrial; or (2) whether the defendant was
required to move for mistrial because the prosecutor deliberately or reck-
lessly crossed the line between "legitimate adversarial gamesmanship and
manifestly improper methods that rendered trial before the jury unfair to
such a degree that no judicial admonishment could have cured it.' '31 The
court then remanded the case to the court of appeals.
In State v. Rocha,32 the court issued a per curiam opinion finding that
the double jeopardy argument should fail in a case in which the defend-
ant was assessed a controlled substances tax and later prosecuted for pos-
sessing a controlled substance, following its prior decision in Ex parte
Ward.33
In Windom v. State,34 the defendant was indicted for aggravated rob-
bery and pursuant to a plea bargain, pled no contest to a reduced charge
of robbery. The defendant was sentenced to forty years. On the same
date, the trial court granted the defendant's motion for a new trial. The
defendant was later tried for aggravated robbery, convicted of a lesser
included offense of robbery, and sentenced by the court to life confine-
ment. The defendant complained on appeal that the double jeopardy
clauses of the United States and Texas Constitutions barred his prosecu-
tion for aggravated robbery, relying upon Parker v. State.35 Parker in-
volved an initial guilty plea to robbery, an order permitting the defendant
to withdraw his plea of guilty, which had not involved a plea bargain, and
the defendant's subsequent prosecution for aggravated robbery and con-
viction for the same.
The Parker court held that this case was premised upon a plea bargain
and that when the trial court granted the defendant's motion for mistrial,
the agreement was essentially voided and, thus, lacked the negotiated
plea. In other words, the remedy was to return the parties to their origi-
30. See id. at 22.
31. Bauder, 974 S.W.2d at 732.
32. 968 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
33. 964 S.W.2d 617 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc); see also Ledford v. State, 970
S.W.2d 17 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc) (holding the same under the same facts).
34. 968 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
35. 626 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
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nal positions, which distinctly opened up the possibility that the defend-
ant could be prosecuted on the original charge. 36
In Ex parte Rhodes,37 the court addressed the question of whether the
double jeopardy clause prohibited a criminal prosecution for interference
with child custody following a criminal contempt conviction for the same
conduct. This case involved the defendant's divorce from his wife in
which a trial court entered a decree ordering that the child of the parties
reside in Harris County and enjoining both parties from changing the
child's county of residence without prior court approval. In violation of
the order, the defendant took the child out of the country, and, upon his
return, the defendant was arrested for interference with child custody.
The defendant's former wife instituted proceedings to have the defendant
found in contempt of court for violating the custody order. Following a
civil hearing, the defendant was fined. Based upon that finding, the de-
fendant argued that criminal prosecution for interference with child cus-
tody was jeopardy barred. The trial court agreed with the defendant.
The fourteenth court of appeals reversed the trial court's decision to
grant relief on the writ of habeas corpus, finding that a criminal contempt
action, initiated by a private party, did not prohibit a subsequent criminal
prosecution based on the same conduct.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that although the opinions
were "fractured" in United States v. Dixon,38 the Dixon case, nonetheless,
was precedent and did apply in this case. Tallying the individual votes in
Dixon and applying the rationale of each of those votes, the court held
that, under Dixon, since the defendant had already been prosecuted for
contempt of court, his subsequent prosecution was barred by the double
jeopardy clause for interference with child custody.39
In Landers v. State,40 the defendant stole a truck and was indicted on
two counts: theft of property valued at $750 or more but less than $20,000
and unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Both counts related to the
same owner and the same occurrence date. Habitual allegations were in-
cluded in the indictment. The jury convicted the defendant of unauthor-
ized use of a motor vehicle, for which he received a sixty-two year
sentence from the jury, and a lesser included offense of theft of property
valued at $250 or more but less than $750, for which he received a nine
month jail sentence from the jury.
The court of appeals held that the convictions on both offenses violated
the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause because the unauthor-
ized use of a motor vehicle conviction was a lesser included offense of
theft. The court reformed the judgment to delete the conviction and sen-
tence for theft. In his petition for discretionary review, the defendant
36. See also Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971); Shannon v. State, 708
S.W.2d 850 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (en banc).
37. 974 S.W.2d 735 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
38. Id. at 739; see also United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993).
39. See Rhodes, 974 S.W.2d at 739.
40. 957 S.W.2d 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
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argued that the court of appeals should have dismissed the conviction for
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle rather than for the theft offense.
The Court of Criminal Appeals stated that the sole issue was the
proper remedy for the double jeopardy violation. The court noted that
the federal double jeopardy principles do not dictate which conviction
must be set aside.41 The court adopted the "most serious punishment"
test previously utilized in the misjoinder context, particularly because a
legislature had not enacted a statute addressing this situation.42 This test
"requires retaining the offense with the most serious punishment and va-
cating any remaining offenses that are the 'same' for double jeopardy
purposes. ' 43 "The 'most serious punishment' is the longest sentence im-
posed, with rules of parole eligibility and good time serving as a tie
breaker." 44
V. SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In State v. Guzman,45 the Court of Criminal Appeals overruled long
standing precedent 46 and, consistent with decisions of the United States
Supreme Court,47 held that a vehicle lawfully in police custody may be
searched on the basis of probable cause to believe that it contained con-
traband. There was no requirement of exigent circumstances to justify
such a warrantless search. The decision reversed that of the court of ap-
peals, which found that the search exceeded the consent given and that,
while there was probable cause, there were no exigent circumstances.
In Loesch v. State,4" the court examined the methodology utilized by
the court of appeals in conducting a deferential review of whether the
facts gave rise to reasonable suspicion in a border patrol search. The
court criticized the approach used because the court of appeals examined
each of the different factors in isolation to determine whether each mili-
tates in favor of or against a finding of reasonable suspicion rather than
under the totality of the circumstances. In addition, the Court of Appeals
utilized the "as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity"
construct, which was recently disavowed in Woods v. State.49
In Woods, a defendant entered the Travis County Courthouse through
the main entrance and passed a sign informing the public that those who
enter were subject to a search.50 When the defendant saw a metal detec-
41. See Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (1985).
42. The greater and lesser included offense rationale has been applied when the
greater offense is the only indicted offense in the case. See Landers, 974 S.W.2d at 559.
43. Id. at 560.
44. Id.
45. 959 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
46. See Gauldin v. State, 683 S.W.2d 411 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc); Maldo-
nado v. State, 528 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).
47. See Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982); United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478
(1985).
48. 958 S.W.2d 830 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
49. 956 S.W.2d 33 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
50. See id. at 34.
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tor and an x-ray machine, she looked surprised and scared, turned toward
a justice of the peace courtroom, and then started back out the main en-
trance. Eventually, she was stopped outside and brought back inside,
where her purse was scanned and a pistol discovered.
The court reviewed the applicability of the "as consistent with innocent
activity as with criminal activity" construct and held that it was no longer
a viable test for determining reasonable suspicion. The court held that
the reasonableness of a temporary detention must be examined in
terms of the totality of the circumstances and [would] be justified
when the detaining officer has specific articulable facts, which taken
together with rational inferences from those facts, lead him to con-
clude that the person detained actually is, has been, or soon will be
engaged in criminal activity. 51
In Williams v. State,52 the court held that the legal maxim of "expressio
unius est exclusio alterius" was not applicable to require inclusion of the
date on which the search warrant was issued in the computation of
whether the search warrant was timely executed. 53 The warrant directing
that it be returned "within three days, exclusive of the date of its execu-
tion" could be executed on the fourth day after its issuance. 54
VI. CHARGING INSTRUMENT
In Ex parte Patterson,55 the defendant challenged his life sentence for
attempted capital murder by attacking one of his two prior felony convic-
tions alleged for enhancement. A prior post conviction writ had success-
fully attacked the prior burglary conviction as fundamentally defective
for failing to allege a required element of burglary, and the conviction
was held to be void in an unpublished opinion. The present writ claimed
entitlement to a new trial because this void prior felony conviction had
been used to enhance the defendant's punishment. The court held that
the attempted capital murder indictment contained a cognizable defect
when it relied on a void judgment of conviction to enhance. The court
also noted that "a cognizable defect is present because the indictment's
reliance on the void conviction renders it voidable and subjects the en-
hancement portion of the indictment to being voided by the trial court."'56
However, the court also found that the defendant's "failure to object to
the error in the enhancement portion of the indictment waived the error
by procedural default. ' 57 An indictment or information containing a de-
fect of substance, which still purports to charge an offense, is not funda-
mentally defective and, in the absence of a pre-trial objection, will
51. Id. at 38.
52. 965 S.W.2d 506 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
53. Id. at 507.
54. Id.
55. 969 S.W.2d 16 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
56. Id. at 19.
57. Id. at 20.
[Vol. 52
PRETRIAL, TRIAL, AND APPEAL
support a conviction. 58
The court nevertheless remanded the cause to the trial court as the
applicant had alleged facts that, if true, might entitle him to relief on the
basis of a denial of the right to effective assistance of counsel who may
have failed to investigate the validity of the prior conviction or objected
to its use for enhancement. The trial court was instructed to make appro-
priate findings of fact and conclusions of law as to trial counsel's
effectiveness.
In Brooks v. State,59 the delivery of a controlled substance indictment
did not contain an enhancement paragraph. The State filed a motion for
leave to amend the indictment to add an allegation that the defendant
had previously been convicted of attempted murder. The court's order
granting the motion set forth the details of the prior conviction, and
granted leave for the State to amend the indictment.
The State did not physically alter the indictment, and, at the punish-
ment hearing, the State read the information about the prior conviction
to the jury without objection and the trial court included the enhance-
ment in the punishment charge. On appeal, the defendant claimed that
the "State's failure to physically alter the original indictment document to
include the amendment violated [his] constitutional right to be apprised
of the accusations against him."' 60 The court initially noted that Article
27.01 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that an indictment is
the State's "primary pleading in a criminal action" and Article 21.03 pro-
vides that "[e]verything should be stated in an indictment which is neces-
sary to be proved. ' 61 This provision has been construed to mean that an
indictment must include "everything necessary to be proven to sustain a
conviction in the guilt/innocence phase" of a trial.62 The court ultimately
held that:
[a]s with deadly weapon findings, prior convictions used as enhance-
ments must be pled in some form, but they need not be pled in the
indictment-although it is permissible and perhaps preferable to do
so. In this case, the requisite notice was conveyed by the State's mo-
58. A defect of substance in a charging instrument will not automatically render a
judgment void. The Texas Constitution still requires the indictment or information charge
a person with the commission of an offense. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 12(b). Article
1.14(b) of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure was amended to provide:
[i]f the defendant does not object to a defect, error, or irregularity of form or
substance in an indictment or information before the date on which the trial
on the merits commences, he waives and forfeits the right to object to the
defect, error, or irregularity and he may not raise the objection on appeal or
in any other post-conviction proceeding. Nothing in this article prohibits a
trial court from requiring that an objection to an indictment or information
be made at an earlier time in compliance with Article 28.01 of this code.
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 1997).
59. 957 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
60. Id. at 31.
61. Id. at 32.




tion and the trial court's order.63
In Duron v. State,64 the defendant pled guilty to indecency with a child.
He complained on appeal that the charging instrument was not a legal
indictment because it did not charge "the commission of an offense." The
indictment alleged that the defendant, acting with intent to arouse his
own sexual desire, had sexual contact with a child younger than seven-
teen years of age who was not his spouse. These allegations contained all
of the statutory elements of indecency with a child under Texas Penal
Code Section 21.11(a)(1). The defendant argued, however, that the in-
dictment contained factual allegations establishing, if true, that appellant
was not guilty of indecency with a child, as the indictment alleged. Sexual
contact between the defendant and the child occurred when the defend-
ant rubbed his private part between the child's legs. The law defines
"sexual contact" only as "any touching of the anus, breast or any part of
the genitals of another person," and "because legs are not included, the
purported indictment [did] not actually charge the commission of an of-
fense and is not, therefore, an indictment so as to confer jurisdiction on
the trial court. '65
The court reviewed the problematic history of indictments and the obli-
gation of defense counsel to object, commencing with Studer v. State.66
The court also noted that in Cook v. State,67 it held that to comprise an
indictment within the meaning of Article V, Section 12, the instrument
must charge: (1) a person (2) with the commission of an offense. The
written instrument was not a legal indictment in Cook because it did not
allege the identity of any person. Recognizing the persuasive sources, 68
the court held that "a written instrument is an indictment or information
under the Constitution if it accuses someone of a crime with enough clar-
ity and specificity to identify the penal statute under which the State in-
tends to prosecute, even if the instrument is otherwise defective."'69 Thus,
notwithstanding the inclusion of factual allegations that may arguably evi-
dence the defendant's innocence in this case, there is no doubt that the
State intended to accuse the defendant of indecency with a child.
In Grant v. State,70 the information charging evading arrest alleged that
the defendant fled from "Officer Lawson," a peace officer who was at-
tempting to arrest or detain the defendant. The trial evidence identified
the peace officer as "Lieutenant Craig Lawson." The defendant argued
and the court of appeals agreed that there was a fatal variance because
the State pled but failed to prove that Lawson's first name was "Officer."
63. Id. at 34 (citation omitted).
64. 956 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
65. Id. at 551.
66. 799 S.W.2d 263 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (en banc).
67. 902 S.W.2d 471 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (en banc).
68. See George E. Dix, Texas Charging Instrument Law: The 1985 Revisions and the
Continuing Need For Reform, 38 BAYLOR L. REV. 1, at 39-40, n.137 (1986); Cook, 902
S.W.2d at 480 (Clinton, J., concurring).
69. Duron, 956 S.W.2d at 550-51.
70. 970 S.W.2d 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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The court held that this indeed was not a case involving a "variance" of
any type. Instead the case involved a missing allegation required by stat-
ute to be included in the charging instrument. "Officer" was the com-
plainant's title, not his first name. While his first name should have been
in the charging instrument, the error was waived when the defendant
failed to object. 71 As "Officer" was not an allegation of Lawson's first
name, the State was not required to prove that it was Lawson's first
name.
VII. PLEA OF GUILTY
In High v. State,72 the court of appeals reversed a conviction based
upon the failure of the trial court to admonish the defendant of the de-
portation consequences of his guilty plea under Article 26.13(a)(1) of the
Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The Court of Criminal Appeals re-
manded the case for a harm analysis based upon the premise that "no
error" is "categorically immune to a harmless error analysis" other than
structural error.73
In Carroll v. State,74 the defendant was convicted pursuant to a non-
negotiated guilty plea of two counts of delivery of marijuana and sen-
tenced to five years imprisonment and a fine. After the guilty pleas were
accepted by the trial court, the court recessed pending a pre-sentence in-
vestigation. When court reconvened, the state called the defendant as a
witness and indicated to defense counsel if the defendant did not testify it
would "reflect very seriously on the court's decisions." Thus, the defend-
ant testified. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the written
waiver executed by the defendant, including his waiver of his Fifth
Amendment right not to testify, did not extend to the punishment phase
of the proceeding. The Court of Criminal Appeals distinguished authori-
ties relied upon by the court of appeals 75 on the ground that those situa-
tions presented two separate hearings, one on guilt/innocence and one on
punishment, and waiver and actually testifying at the guilt/innocence
hearing did not constitute a waiver as to Fifth Amendment rights at the
punishment phase. In the instant case, when the defendant plead guilty
in a non-negotiated plea bargain situation, the defendant was not entitled
to a bifurcated trial and once the guilty plea was entered, the procedure
became a "unitary trial" to determine the remaining issue of punishment.
There is no per se "punishment phase" when the defendant pleads guilty
and, therefore, the defendant's waiver in this case extended to this
proceeding.
71. See TEx. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 1.14(b) (Vernon 1997); Studer, 799 S.W.2d
263.
72. 964 S.W.2d 637 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
73. See Cain v. State, 947 S.W.2d 262, 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
74. 975 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
75. See generally Wilkens v. State, 847 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (en banc);
Beathard v. State, 767 S.W.2d 423 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) (en banc); Brumfield v. State,




In Roberts v. State,76 the trial court conducted a jury shuffle after the
voir dire over the defendant's objection. This resulted in two members of
the panel, who previously could not have been reached, moving into the
strike zone. The defendant exercised a peremptory strike to remove one
of these members. The court of appeals found reversible error by virtue
of the jury shuffle. The Court of Criminal Appeals remanded in order
that the court of appeals would conduct a harmless error analysis deter-
mination in view of Cain v. State.77
The concurring opinion by Judge Meyers in Roberts indicated by foot-
note that while trial and appellate courts may have less to worry about
concerning non-constitutional voir dire error, the defendant's burden has
now become greater. The defendant must now show that the error
caused him to be deprived of a fair and impartial trial, and the only error
which may qualify is an erroneous denial of a challenge for cause against
a venire person who ultimately served and who testified during voir dire
that he could not be fair and impartial.
In Johnson v. State,78 the Court of Criminal Appeals determined that
the defendant asked for a shuffle of the jury panel before the venire was
seated. After the venire was seated, sworn, and qualified, the defendant
asked that the jury be shuffled again. The judge asked if the panel had
been shuffled at the defendant's request and if the defendant was asking
for a second shuffle, and the defendant's attorney answered affirmatively.
The court held that based upon these facts and the defendant's failure to
raise any objections to the reordering or shuffle that was previously done,
and the defendant's reason for a second shuffle, the trial judge could have
reasonably concluded that the defendant was not entitled to the shuffle
he was seeking. Therefore, the court did not err in denying the defend-
ant's request for a shuffle. While the court of appeals properly reviewed
the legal principles concerning jury shuffles, it erred in its application.
The court of appeals wrote in part:
A shuffle cannot take place, however, until it first is determined pre-
cisely which persons will constitute the jury panel for the case. The
parties have the right to view the entire venire in proper sequence
and then have the names shuffled. A defendant cannot be deemed
to have exercised his right to a jury shuffle without having had the
76. 978 S.W.2d 580 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
77. See Cain, 947 S.W.2d 262. In Cain, the court stated:
Except for certain federal constitutional errors labeled by the United States
Supreme Court as 'structural,' no error, whether it relates to jurisdiction, vol-
untariness of a plea, or any other mandatory requirement, is categorically
immune to a harmless error analysis. Of course, where the error involved
defies analysis by harmless error standards or the data is insufficient to con-
duct a meaningful harmless error analysis, then the error will not be proven
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt under [former] Rule 81(b)(2) [now
Rule 44.2].
Id. at 264.
78. 977 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998) (en banc).
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opportunity to present the motion for a shuffle to the judge ...
[J]ury shuffles will be performed in the courtroom.... A defendant
has the absolute right to a "reshuffle" if the original shuffle was
caused by someone other than the State, such as the trial judge or
court personnel. 79
The Court of Criminal Appeals emphasized the procedural aspects to
preserve error by writing: "Complaints about jury shuffle error must be
preserved. To prevail on appeal, a defendant must raise a specific objec-
tion about the jury shuffle at trial. If Art. 35.11 has not been followed,
and a defendant requested the improper procedure, appellate review of
the impropriety is precluded."80
IX. VOIR DIRE
In Sadler v. State,81 the defendant, during voir dire, asked the panel,
"Who would not be able to consider the minimum punishment if you
found somebody guilty and there was a child victim (and/or a child) pres-
ent?" Nine venire persons responded they would not, and the defendant
challenged them for cause alleging bias against the law. When the trial
court denied the challenges, the defendant used peremptory strikes to
remove these venire persons. The defendant requested and was denied
additional peremptory strikes. After the court reviewed the notion of
"bias" under Article 35.16(c)(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the
court approved the issue as framed by the court of appeals as being:
"whether, in the proper aggravated robbery case, where the facts justify it
and the law allows it, the veniremember can fully and fairly consider the
entire range of punishment, including the minimum and [maximum]. '8 2
The court declined to follow the defendant's argument that jurors must
not only be willing to consider the entire range of punishment for a crime
but also for the manner in which the defendant committed it. Instead the
law requires jurors to use the facts to tailor the punishment to the crime
as committed by the guilty defendant and thus it would be "nonsensical
to rule that a juror who will use the facts to fit the punishment to the
crime is unqualified .... ",83 The court ultimately held that a prospective
juror would not be challengeable for cause based on his or her inability to
consider the full range of punishment as long as he or she can consider
the full range of punishment for the offense as defined by law. The court
explained that bias against the law was a refusal to consider or apply the
relevant law and existed when a venire person's beliefs or opinions
"would prevent or substantially impair the performance of his duties as a
juror in accordance with his instructions and oath. '84
79. Johnson v. State, 944 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997) (citations
omitted).
80. Johnson, 977 S.W.2d at 139 (citations omitted).
81. Id. at 140.
82. Id. at 142.
83. Id. at 143.
84. Id. at 142.
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In Anson v. State,85 a case involving aggravated sexual assault of a
child, a number of prospective jurors responded when asked whether
there was anything of a personal nature that they wanted to discuss at the
bench. After the judge privately questioned the panelists, defense coun-
sel was prohibited from individually questioning three of them. Defense
counsel used peremptory strikes to exclude each of the three and did not
request additional peremptory challenges, and none of them served on
the jury. The defendant complained on appeal that the trial court erred
in prohibiting individual questioning of each of the prospective jurors by
defense counsel. The court acknowledged that the harm analysis applied
to the erroneous denial of a defendant's challenge for cause likewise ap-
plied to the erroneous prohibition of proper questioning of individual
prospective jurors. "For the erroneous denial of challenges for cause, a
defendant is harmed only if (1) he exhausts all of his peremptory chal-
lenges, (2) he requests more challenges, (3) his request is denied, and (4)
he identifies an objectionable person seated on the jury on whom he
would have exercised a peremptory challenge. '86 As the defendant made
no request for additional challenges, the defendant suffered no harm.
X. JURY OF ELEVEN
In Roberts v. State,87 the defendant requested leave of the court to pro-
ceed with 11 jurors after learning that one of the jurors had communi-
cated with a potential State's witness. The eleven member jury convicted
the defendant. The defendant argued that an accused could not waive the
requirement of Article 36.29(a) of the Code of Criminal Procedure that
no less than twelve jurors render a verdict in a felony case. The court
held that a defendant may waive his statutory right to a jury of twelve
members.88
XI. DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS
In Gassaway v. State,89 the defendant, convicted of DWI, claimed on
appeal that the jury should not have been allowed to view that portion of
the DWI video tape showing the defendant counting and reciting the al-
phabet during the course of taking field sobriety tests because these tests
were testimonial in nature and violated his Fifth Amendment rights. The
defendant relied upon state and U.S. Supreme Court authorities. 90 In
Vickers, the defendant recited the alphabet from "F" to "W" and counted
backwards from ninety to seventy-five. In Muniz, the defendant was
85. 959 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
86. Id. at 204.
87. 957 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
88. See id. at 81; see also Hatch v. State, 958 S.W.2d 813 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en
banc); Herrell v. State (Tex. Crim. App. 0382-97-Dec. 2, 1998 (opinion not yet available)
(same holding))
89. 957 S.W.2d 48 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) (en banc).
90. See generally Vickers v. State, 878 S.W.2d 329 (Tex. App.-Ft. Worth 1994, pet.
ref'd); Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582 (1990).
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asked seven questions regarding his name, address, weight, eye color,
date of birth and current age, and the date of his sixth birthday. He was
also asked to perform three field sobriety tests involving counting. The
Supreme Court concluded that Muniz's response to the sixth birthday
question was testimonial in nature, citing Doe v. United States,91 which
held that "in order to be testimonial, an accused's communication must
itself, explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose
information. ,92
The court, reiterating previous holdings,93 held that the recitation of
the alphabet and counting backwards are not testimonial in nature be-
cause these types of communications are physical evidence of the func-
tioning of the defendant's mental and physical faculties and because the
defendant's performance shows the condition of his body. Any indication
of intoxication comes from a "suspect's demeanor, the manner in which
he speaks, and whether he has the mental ability to perform the tests
correctly. '94 Further, reciting and counting do not involve an express or
implied assertion of fact or belief and, therefore, the defendant was not
confronted with the "cruel trilemma" of "truth, falsity, or silence." 95
Thus, the defendant's recitation of the alphabet and counting backwards
were not compelled in violation of his right to be free from self-
incrimination.
XII. EXPERT WITNESS TESTIMONY
In Weatherred v. State,96 the court of criminal appeals reviewed the trial
court's decision excluding expert witness evidence. It held that the trial
court erred in excluding expert testimony regarding photo bias and eye
witness identification, and reversed and remanded the case for a new
trial. The State's petition for discretionary review complained that the
court of appeals failed to address every issue raised and necessary to the
final disposition of the appeal on this point.97 More specifically, the State
argued that the appellate court failed to address its claim that the trial
court's exclusion of the expert witness' testimony could be upheld be-
cause the probative value of the testimony was substantially outweighed
by its prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.98 In addition, the State
claimed that the appellate court did not perform a proper analysis of the
admissibility of the expert testimony pursuant to Rule 702.99
91. 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
92. Id. at 210.
93. See Jones v. State, 795 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Chadwick v. State, 766
S.W.2d 819 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1988, pet. granted) affd 795 S.W.2d 177 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990).
94. Gassaway, 957 S.W.2d at 51.
95. Id. at 50.
96. 975 S.W.2d 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
97. TEX. R. App. P 47.1.
98. TEX. R. GRIM. EvID. 403.
99. TEX. R. CRIM. EvID. 702
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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals pointed to its previous decision
that set out the standard for admission of expert testimony in the so-
called "'soft"' sciences, that is, "'fields of study aside from the hard sci-
ences, such as the social sciences or fields that are based primarily upon
experience and training as opposed to the scientific method.' '"100 The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that the appellate court did
not have the benefit of that decision and remanded the case to the court
of appeals for reconsideration of the Rule 702 issue in light of Nenno and
of the issue relative to Rule 403.101
XIII. JURY ARGUMENT
In Renteria v. State,102 the defendant complained of the prosecutor's
jury argument, which urged a jury verdict of guilt based upon the law of
parties. The trial court instructed the jury on the law of criminal respon-
sibility as a party in the abstract but did not apply the law to the facts in
an application paragraph. The court of appeals reversed, holding that the
prosecutor's jury argument improperly allowed the State to argue a the-
ory of criminal responsibility not properly included in the jury charge.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals recognized the legal proposition
that "error in jury argument does not lie in going beyond the court's
charge, but in stating law contrary to the same."'10 3 Assuming, therefore,
that the prosecutor's argument extended beyond the court's instructions,
there was no error because the State properly argued the law of parties to
the jury.
XIV. PRESERVATION OF ERROR
In Warner v. State,04 a prosecution for aggravated kidnapping, aggra-
vated assault, and arson, the State filed a motion in limine requesting that
the defendant be instructed not to refer to any matter in the presence of
the jury to show that he had attended or completed any counseling or
other rehabilitation for any stress disorder. At a hearing on the State's
motion, the defendant explained that he had once been a veteran of the
Vietnam War and suffered from "post-traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD)
and that he had received counseling for that disorder.105 Citing Cowles v.
State,10 6 the defendant argued that the evidence was admissible to prove
he did not have the specific intent necessary to commit the offenses.10 7
The trial court granted the State's motion in limine and found that the
evidence of PTSD was admissible only at the punishment stage. The de-
100. Weatherred, 975 S.W.2d at 323-24 (quoting Nenno v. State, 970 S.W.2d 549, 561
(Tex. Crim. App. 1998)).
101. See id.
102. 977 S.W.2d 606, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 88 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
103. Id. at *4.
104. 969 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
105. See id. at 2.
106. 510 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
107. See Warner, 969 S.W.2d at 1.
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fendant did not offer the evidence at the guilt/innocence stage and the
jury convicted him of each offense. The trial court assessed the prison
sentences to run concurrently. The court of appeals rejected the defend-
ant's argument that the trial court erred in excluding such evidence. The
court of criminal appeals concluded it had granted the defendant's peti-
tion improvidently because the defendant had not preserved his com-
plaint for appellate review.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, in its per curiam opinion,
stressed that the defendant did not define PTSD for the court or explain
how he intended to prove that he suffered from that disorder. Equally
important, the defendant did not show how evidence of PTSD would be
relevant to the question of specific intent. In essence, the defendant
wholly failed to preserve error. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
emphasized that appellate error may not be predicated upon a ruling ex-
cluding evidence unless a substantial right of a party is affected and sub-
stance of the evidence was made known to the trial court by an offer of
proof by the context within which questions were asked. The offer of
proof can assume the form of question and answer or a concise statement
by counsel. In the latter case, the statement must include a "reasonably
specific summary of the evidence offered and must state the relevance of
the evidence unless the relevance is apparent, so that the court can deter-
mine whether the evidence is relevant and admissible.' 110 8
In this case, the defendant did not make an adequate offer of proof
before or during the guilt/innocence stage. Actually, in this latter situa-
tion, the court noted that a ruling on the State's motion in limine exclud-
ing defense evidence was subject to reconsideration throughout the entire
trial, however, in order to preserve error, an offer of proof was required
to be made at trial. No offer of proof was properly made.
XV. COURT'S CHARGE
In Moore v. State,109 a capital murder prosecution in which the defend-
ant received the death penalty, the State's evidence showed through an
eye witness that the defendant fired a rifle multiple times and killed two
individuals in a car after an argument in the parking lot of a club during
early morning hours. The defense eye witness testified about violent and
obnoxious behavior by both decedents in the club and about a nasty con-
frontation outside the club, followed immediately by efforts of one of the
decedents to run down the defendant in the parking lot. When someone
in the crowd threw the defendant a rifle, he unloaded it into the vehicle,
killing both occupants.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals addressed the trial court's action
in denying requested instructions on voluntary manslaughter and murder,
ultimately holding that the trial court erred in refusing each request. The
108. Id. at 4 (citations omitted).
109. 969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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court reiterated the two step test to determine whether a charge on a
lesser included offense must be given.' 1"
The first inquiry is whether the offense fell within Article 37.09 C.C.P.,
that is, whether the lesser included offense was included within the proof
necessary to establish the offense charged.' 1 ' The second inquiry is
whether there is some evidence that would permit a rational jury to find
that the defendant is guilty only of the lesser offense. All of the evidence
in the record must be evaluated, and there must be some evidence from
which a rational jury can acquit the defendant of the greater offense and,
at the same time, convict him of the lesser included offense. It is irrele-
vant as to whether the evidence is credible, controverted, or conflicting.
The court first held that voluntary manslaughter was a lesser included
offense of murder based upon the rationale expressed in Johnson v.
State. 12 In Johnson, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals acknowledged
that murder and voluntary manslaughter required proof of the same cul-
pable mental state, "intentional or knowing," but the addition of "sudden
passion" to Section 19.04 of the Texas Penal Code tempered the culpabil-
ity of the mental state that would otherwise turn a person's conduct into
murder. 13
The second inquiry focused on the sort of evidence required to prove
"sudden passion." The court rejected any approach that would categorize
"sudden passion" as a subjective concept requiring direct evidence. In-
stead, the court recognized that "sudden passion" was essentially a culpa-
ble mental state and, as such, may be inferred from the defendant's acts,
words, and conduct. Evidence relevant to proving adequate cause would
certainly be relevant to proving sudden passion.
In this light, the court in Moore reviewed the facts 1 4 and found that a
jury could have rationally found that the events would commonly pro-
110. See also Aguilar v. State, 682 S.W.2d 556, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985); Royster v.
State, 622 S.W.2d 442, 466 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
111. This inquiry paraphrases the language of Article 37.09(1), which describes the kind
of lesser included offense most frequently encountered. The court noted that another defi-
nition of lesser included offense in subdivisions (2), (3), or (4) of Article 37.09 may apply as
well in the first step of any given case. Obviously, the first step applies the relevant defini-
tion to the offense charged and the offense in question. See Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 8.
112. 815 S.W.2d 707 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
113. The holding of the plurality opinion in Bradley v. State, 688 S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1985), was overruled. The statements in part Ill of the minority opinion in State v.
Lee, 818 S.W.2d 778, 781-82 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991), were disapproved.
114. See Moore, 969 S.W.2d at 11.
[i]n this case, Tyron Parks testified that the shootings took place in the highly
charged atmosphere of a fight. He said that the victims, Boyd and Clark,
were acting hostile and intoxicated. At one point during the altercation,
Parks thought Boyd was trying to pull a pistol out. Later, Boyd pushed the
[defendant], and then tried to grab Parks. Parks considered cutting Boyd's
throat, but then decided against it and threw Boyd to the ground. Boyd got
up and ran over to the car in the street next to the club, where Clark was
revving the engine. Clark tried to run over the appellant and Parks with the
car, missed, and then backed up and tried again. It was at this point that the
appellant got a rifle and shot Boyd and Clark.
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duce a degree of anger, rage, and the like in a person of ordinary temper,
sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection. Therefore, the
jury could have acquitted the defendant on the charge of capital murder
and found him guilty only of voluntary manslaughter. Thus, it was error
to refuse the charge on the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter.
In addition, the court's charge on self defense authorized an acquittal
based upon self defense as against either of the decedents, Clark or Boyd.
The court concluded that a requested instruction as to murder was re-
quired because if the defendant was justified in killing Clark in self de-
fense, then he did not murder Clark, in which event the murder of Boyd
was not capital murder since the defendant did not murder more than
one person. Thus, the trial court erred a second time in refusing the
lesser included instruction on murder.
In Blake v. State,115 the defendant argued that the trial court erred by
not submitting the factual issue of the juvenile's accomplice status to the
jury. The court of appeals held that the accomplice witness rule did not
apply to juveniles who could not be prosecuted under the Penal Code.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reviewed ample precedent holding
that, while the testimony of an adult accomplice offered by the prosecu-
tion must be corroborated in order to support a conviction, the testimony
of an identically situated child did not require corroboration. After an
extensive discussion of the rule, the court held that the juvenile exception
to the accomplice witness rule was abolished and that the testimony of
juveniles who could potentially be subject to State sanctioned punishment
was now subject to the accomplice witness rule in the same manner as the
testimony of an adult. The determination of whether a particular juvenile
is an accomplice for purposes of the accomplice witness rule must be
made in the same manner as the determination of whether a particular
adult is an accomplice for purposes of the rule.116
In Arevalo v. State,1 7 the defendant was convicted of sexual assault
and aggravated sexual assault. When the defendant's petition for discre-
tionary review was first granted, the court held that the State was bound
by the second prong of the Royster/Aguilar test and remanded the case to
the court of appeals to address the State's claims that the record included
evidence that the defendant was guilty only of sexual assault.'1 8
115. 971 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
116. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals stated that:
Juveniles against whom criminal proceedings or juvenile adjudications have
been instituted for the same offense as the defendant or a lesser included
offense are accomplices as a matter of law. If no proceedings have been
instituted, the juvenile is an accomplice as a matter of fact if the jury finds the
record contains sufficient evidence linking the juvenile to the criminal of-
fense as a blameworthy participant. Each case must be considered on its own
facts.
Id. at 461.
117. 970 S.W.2d 547 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
118. See id.; Aguilar, 682 S.W.2d 556; Royster, 622 S.W.2d 442.
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The court of appeals next held that because the defendant agreed there
was conflicting evidence on one of three aggravating factors, the trial
court did not err by submitting aggravated sexual assault. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the State presented evidence on all
three theories of aggravation and that the jury charge required the jury to
find only one of the three to convict the defendant of aggravated sexual
assault. If the evidence was disputed on only one of those theories and
the evidence on the remaining two was uncontested, then the jury could
not rationally find the defendant guilty only of the lesser included of-
fense. Thus, the court held that if sufficient evidence of more than one
theory of the greater offense is presented to allow the jury to be charged
on alternate theories, then the second prong of the Royster/Aguilar test is
satisfied only if there is evidence which, if believed, refutes or negates
every theory which elevates the offense from the lesser to the greater.
Therefore, only if every theory properly submitted was challenged would
the jury be permitted to find the defendant guilty only of the lesser
offense.
In Mann v. State,' 19 an aggravated assault prosecution, the parties con-
ceded that the jury instructions contained one paragraph which inaccu-
rately set forth the State's burden of proof as being less than beyond a
reasonable doubt. The court of appeals found the error harmless. The
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals cited Abdnor v. State,120 as the author-
ity setting forth the appropriate method for analyzing errors in a jury
charge: (1) the reviewing court must determine whether the jury charge
contained error; and (2) the court must determine whether sufficient
harm resulted from the error to require reversal. 121 Because there was
no objection involved in this case, the court must determine whether the
defendant suffered egregious harm as a result of the error. In determin-
ing if the defendant suffered egregious harm, the error must be "assayed
in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, including the
contested issues and weight of the probative evidence, the argument of
counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the record of the
trial as a whole."' 22
After reviewing both state and federal authorities in which the instruc-
tions on reasonable doubt were entirely omitted, 123 the court held that
where an error in the jury charge on reasonable doubt or burden of proof
119. 964 S.W.2d 639 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
120. 871 S.W.2d 726 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
121. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals wrote in part:
The standard to determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the charg-
ing error to require reversal depends upon whether appellant objected.
Where there has been a timely objection made at trial, an appellate court will
search for only "some harm." By contrast, where the error is urged for the
first time on appeal, a reviewing court will search for "egregious harm."
Mann, supra note 118, at 641.
122. Abdnor, 871 S.W.2d at 733.
123. See Geesa v. State, 820 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Sullivan v. Louisiana,
508 U.S. 275 (1993).
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was isolated to one portion thereof and the remainder of the jury charge
contained language negating that erroneous portion, the effect of the er-
ror is analyzed by employment of the standards set forth by the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals in Abdnor and Almanza, which are based on
Article 36.19 C.C.P. It was held that the court of appeals incorrectly ap-
plied the harmless error rule.124
In Posey v. State,125 the defendant complained for the first time on ap-
peal that the trial court reversibly erred by not sua sponte instructing the
jury on the defense of mistake of fact. The court of appeals agreed that
the defendant was "egregiously harmed." The Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals noted the "harm" standard set forth in Article 36.19 C.C.P., as
construed by Almanza v. State,'26 but emphasized that neither had any
application in determining whether there was "error" in the jury charge,
which was the first inquiry.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that Article 36.14 C.C.P
mandates that a trial court submit a charge setting forth the law "applica-
ble to the case" and observed that the question presented in this case was
whether this provision imposed a duty on the trial court to sua sponte
instruct the jury on unrequested defensive issues. The court held that no
such duty was imposed by Article 36.14 C.C.P., a holding consistent with
the general rules of procedural default and the policies they promote. A
defensive issue is not "applicable to the case" for purposes of Article
36.14 C.C.P. unless the defendant timely requests the issue or objects to
the omission of the issue in the jury charge. The court emphasized that
when the Almanza decision spoke of "erroneous" omissions of issues in
the court's charge, it spoke of omissions of issues upon which a trial judge
had a duty to instruct without a request from either party or issues that
have been timely brought to the trial court's attention.
In Smith v. State,12 7 wherein the defendant was convicted of voluntary
manslaughter, the trial court charged the jury on the law of murder as
well as the lesser included offenses of voluntary manslaughter and invol-
untary manslaughter. The trial court also charged the jury on the law of
self defense, including provocation. The defendant argued that the court
of appeals erroneously held that the provocation instruction was properly
given because there was insufficient evidence to raise the issue. An in-
struction on provocation should only be given when there is evidence
from which a rational jury could find every element of provocation be-
yond a reasonable doubt.128
A charge on provocation is required when there is sufficient evi-
dence (1) that the defendant did some act or used some words which
124. Under Rule 81(b)(2), the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals vacated the judgment
of the court of appeals and remanded to that court for further proceedings. See Mann, 964
S.W.2d at 642.
125. 966 S.W.2d 57 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
126. 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985).
127. 965 S.W.2d 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
128. See id. at 514.
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provoked the attack on him, (2) that such act or words were reason-
ably calculated to provoke the attack, and (3) that the act was done
or the words were used for the purpose and with the intent that the
defendant would have a pretext for inflicting harm upon the other.129
After reviewing the facts, the court held that the provocation instruction
was properly submitted.
XVI. JURY NOTE
In DeGraff v. State,130 an assault case, the jury sent the judge a note
that read, "Did Officer Keener testify that Mr. DeGraff told him that he
hit Ms. Royer[?]"' 3' Over the defendant's objection, the trial court first
told the jury that the court took from the note that the jury was in disa-
greement over a portion of the testimony and then had the court reporter
read back the testimony in question. The court of appeals reversed, find-
ing that the trial court abused its discretion in reading the testimony of
the officer without determining if a disagreement existed. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals remanded for a harmless error analysis. On
remand, the court of appeals found that the trial court's error was not
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. 132 The Court of Criminal Appeals
granted the State's second petition for discretionary review to determine
whether the court of appeals had erred in its holding that the trial court
had abused its discretion.
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals observed regarding jury notes
and the concerns underlying Article 36.28 C.C.P. in responding to them,
that, on the one hand, the trial court cannot comment on the weight of
the evidence and, on the other hand, jurors should have the means of
resolving any factual disputes they might have. The court held that the
jury's request in this case in no way suggested the existence of a disagree-
ment and none could be inferred, and, thus, held that the trial court
abused its discretion in finding a disagreement among the jurors. The
court affirmed the judgment of the court of appeals.
XVII. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
In Curry v. State,133 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals reiterated the
new rule that no longer shall the sufficiency of the evidence be measured
by the jury charge actually given. Instead, the sufficiency of the evidence
must be measured "by the elements of the offense as defined by the hypo-
thetically correct jury charge for the case.' 1 34
In Weightman v. State,135 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals revisited
129. Id. at 513.
130. 962 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
131. Id. at 597.
132. See DeGraff v. State, 944 S.W.2d 504, 508 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1997,
pet. granted), affd 962 S.W.2d 596 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
133. 975 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
134. Id. at 630 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)).
135. 975 S.W.2d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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the sufficiency of the evidence quandary presented in a case involving
"trade secrets," a field with sparse authority. The appellant attacked the
sufficiency of the evidence on a number of fronts, especially on the
ground that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
three drawings and the information contained in these drawings were not
"secret." The court noted that the core element of a trade secret must be
that it remain a secret, but also emphasized that "absolute secrecy is not
required. '136
The court found the evidence legally sufficient, relying upon the Schalk
criteria. In Schalk, the trade secret inquiry revolved around custom-made
computer programs. The court enumerated specific security measures
which had been taken to protect the trade secret status of the computer
programs. 37
In Blanco v. State,'38 the defendant was convicted of burglary of a
habitation and was sentenced to probation. On appeal, the defendant
challenged the sufficiency of the evidence. The court of appeals reversed
and ordered the entry of a judgment of acquittal, holding that "because
the application paragraph of the court's charge did not refer to the law of
parties, the sufficiency of the evidence, when measured against the appli-
cation paragraph, entitled appellant to an acquittal on appeal because he
was guilty only as a party."'1 39 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
granted the state's petition for discretionary review to reexamine the
Benson/Boozer line of cases. 140
While the petition was pending, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
overruled the Benson/Boozer line of cases in Malik v. State.14' The dis-
sent in Blanco emphasized that the holding in Malik was "dicta" and not
binding precedent and that all arguments were misguided and clearly er-
roneous. The majority, however, stated that while the court may have
decided Malik "on broader grounds than those presented in the State's
petition for discretionary review," Malik's decision "is the law and it is
binding precedent. 1 42 Thus, the Court vacated the judgment of the court
of appeals and remanded the cause for reconsideration in light of Malik.
In Cain v. State,'43 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals granted the
State's petition for discretionary review to determine whether the court
of appeals applied the correct legal standard for reviewing the factual
136. Schalk v. State, 823 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
137. The security measures taken included: (1) employment agreement; (2) strict plant
scrutiny; (3) restricted computer access; (4) nonauthorization of disclosure of subject pro-
grams; and (5) general nondisclosure of the programs by the company and its employees.
See Weightman, supra note 134, at 624. Reviewing a combination of these measures, the
court ultimately held the evidence to be sufficient to support the judgment of conviction
for theft of trade secrets (machinery drawings). See id.
138. 962 S.W.2d 46.
139. Id.
140. See Boozer v. State, 717 S.W.2d 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Benson v. State, 661
S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
141. 953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
142. Blanco, supra note 138, at 47.
143. 958 S.W.2d 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
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sufficiency of the evidence. Initially, the court noted that Article 5, Sec-
tion 6 of the Texas Constitution operated as a jurisdictional limitation on
the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, with the consequence that the court
did not have jurisdiction to "pass upon the weight and preponderance of
the evidence or 'unfind' a vital fact." 144 But the inability to decide a
question of fact and, thus, review de novo a court of appeals factual deci-
sion did not preclude entirely any review of the court of appeals' decision.
Whether or not the correct rule of law was applied was a purely legal
question within the jurisdiction of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals,
although a limited one.
The court observed that three major principles were enunciated in
Clewis v. State:'145 (1) the principle of deference to jury findings; (2) the
court of appeals must support a finding of factual insufficiency by provid-
ing a detailed explanation of that finding so that the Texas Court of Crim-
inal Appeals can ensure that the appellate court accorded the proper
deference to the jury findings; and (3) the standard of review for factual
insufficiency states that courts of appeals must review "all [of] the
evidence." 146
In Cain, the court held that, while the court of appeals recited the
proper standard of review, it was not deferential to the jury's determina-
tion of witness credibility, it ignored the evidence supporting the jury's
guilty verdict in the case, and it considered only the evidence that could
be interpreted as favoring the defense theory of the case. Thus, the court
remanded the case to the court of appeals.
XVIII. MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In Awadelkariem v. State,147 the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals ad-
dressed whether a trial court has the power to rescind an order granting a
new trial in view of ample case law disavowing such authority. After a
trial before the court, the defendant was found guilty. Following a sen-
tencing hearing, the trial court assessed a probated sentence. On the
same day, the court granted the defendant's motion for new trial and
later rescinded the order. At a hearing, the court made it clear that it had
granted the motion for new trial pursuant to an agreement from the de-
fendant that he would plead guilty and receive deferred adjudication.
The court later rescinded the order when it discovered the defendant had
reneged on the agreement.
After reviewing and dispatching the worth of various Texas authorities,
and recognizing its own recent decision in Rodriguez v. State,"48 (in which
the court held that the trial court had the authority to rescind an order
granting a mistrial) the court adopted the same stance as the majority of
144. Id. at 408.
145. 922 S.W.2d 126 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
146. See Cain, 958 S.W.2d at 407-08 (citing Clewis, 922 S.W.2d at 129).
147. 974 S.W.2d 721 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
148. 852 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993).
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other jurisdictions, holding that the trial court has the authority and may
freely rescind an order granting or denying a motion for new trial as long
as this action occurs within the seventy-five day time period provided by
the appellate rules.' 49 After the seventy-five day period expires, any or-
der granting or denying a new trial becomes "final."
In Oldham v. State,150 the court reviewed the decision of the court of
appeals permitting Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 2(b) to be used to
suspend Rule 31(a)(1), which required that a motion for new trial be filed
within thirty days after sentencing. The defendant, represented by re-
tained counsel at trial, was convicted of forgery and sentenced by the
court to three years imprisonment. The defendant filed a pro se notice of
appeal and indigency application twenty-eight days after sentencing.
There was a notation in the letter of assignment that the attorney of rec-
ord on the appeal was to be determined, and appellate counsel was ap-
pointed sixty-two days after sentencing. The defendant argued in the
court of appeals that her trial attorney was released on the day of sen-
tencing and that she was without counsel during the time period for filing
a motion for new trial. The court initially recognized that it had previ-
ously held that the defendant was entitled to counsel at a hearing on a
motion for new trial, but the court had not yet addressed the issue of
whether a defendant was entitled to counsel during the time limit for fil-
ing a motion for new trial to assist the defendant in preparing the
motion. 151
The court reviewed case authority requiring "continuity of representa-
tion" from the trial proceeding through the appeal. 152 The court empha-
sized that its painstaking review of the trial record for evidence that trial
counsel thought his duties were completed at the end of the trial and,
thereafter, had abandoned the defendant, wrought no such evidence. The
court held that the scant evidence in the trial record did not rebut the
presumption that the defendant was represented by counsel and that
counsel acted effectively. The court used the fact that the defendant filed
a pro se notice of appeal as evidence that the defendant had been in-
formed of at least some of the appellate remedies by counsel. The court
ultimately held that the record showed the defendant was officially repre-
sented by counsel at all times in the litigation and that the defendant had
failed to overcome the presumption that counsel was acting effectively at
all times.
The court in Oldham also emphasized the deficiencies in the trial court
record.
The appellant in this case did not file a motion for a new trial. She
has never indicated any grounds she would have raised in a motion
for a new trial. She has never claimed that if she were to file a mo-
149. TEX. R. App. P. 21.8(a), (c).
150. 977 S.W.2d 354, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
151. See id. at *60.
152. See generally Ex parte Axel, 757 S.W.2d 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1988); Ward v. State,
740 S.W.2d 794 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
tion for a new trial that she would be entitled to a new trial, or even a
hearing on her motion. The appellant has not claimed that her ap-
peal or other rights were injured in any way due to her failure to file
a motion for a new trial, or that she was not able to raise certain
grounds because she did not first file a motion for a new trial. She
does not claim that her trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file
a motion for new trial. The appellant does not assert that she was
not informed by her trial counsel of the opportunity and grounds for
filing a motion for new trial. In fact, she has not even claimed that if
given the opportunity to do so, that she would have filed, or would
now in fact file, a motion for a new trial. She does claim, instead,
simply that she was without counsel during the time limit for filing
the motion for a new trial. 153
Thus, the facts in this trial record were not particularly compelling,
such as to justify the invocation of Rule 2(b).
In Musgrove v. State' 54 and Carranza v. State,1 55 the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals dealt with the question concerning the presentation of
the motion for new trial to the trial court.
In Musgrove, the defendant filed a motion for new trial alleging jury
misconduct, and it was denied. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
trial court erred by failing to conduct a hearing on the motion. The court
of appeals held that the record failed to show the motion was presented
to the trial court within ten days of its filing as required by Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 31(c)(1).
The defendant argued that the order denying the motion sufficiently
established that the motion was "presented" to the trial court. The State
replied that the motion did not contain a proposed order setting a date
for a hearing and, therefore, the motion was not properly presented. The
court observed that a motion for new trial does not need an attached
proposed order setting a hearing date to establish that the motion was
presented proper to the trial court.
The court acknowledged the decision in Martinez v. State,156 which ex-
amined the term "present" as defined by Webster's to mean "to offer for
consideration." In Martinez, the court found that the defendant timely
presented his motion to the trial court as evidenced by the trial court's
consideration of the motion and by its order overruling it. The Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals agreed with this rationale, emphasizing that
the motion was not overruled by operation of law, and held that the trial
court's ruling by written order denying the motion was evidence that the
court was offered the motion and considered its merits. Thus, this action
by the trial court was sufficient to show the motion was presented to it on
a timely basis.
153. Oldham, 977 S.W.2d at *22-28.
154. 960 S.W.2d 74 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
155. 960 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
156. 846 S.W.2d 345 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, no writ).
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In Carranza, the defendant timely filed a motion for new trial premised
on newly discovered evidence. The motion contained a "fiat" and a pro-
posed order, but all of the spaces remained blank. There was no hearing
on the motion, which was ultimately overruled by operation of the law
pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(e)(3). The record did
not contain any evidence that the trial court actually knew the defendant
had filed a motion for new trial and desired a hearing on it. On direct
appeal to the court of appeals, the defendant claimed the trial court erred
in failing to conduct a hearing on his motion for new trial. The appellate
court found that appellant did not properly present the motion to the trial
court as required by Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 31(c)(1).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the object of the rule
is to put the trial court on actual notice that a defendant desires the trial
court to take some action on the motion for new trial such as a ruling or a
hearing on it, and that the very filing alone of the motion in this case was
not sufficient to show "presentment. 1 57 The court again reviewed the
term "present" under Rule 31(c)(1) and held that the term meant that the
record "must show the movant for a new trial sustained the burden of
actually delivering the motion for new trial to the trial court or otherwise
(brought) the motion to the attention or actual notice of the trial
court.' ' 158 As nothing in the trial record showed the defendant delivered
the motion to the trial court or otherwise brought it to the attention or
actual notice of the trial court, the court of appeals did not err in holding
that the defendant failed to properly present the motion.
XIX. NOTICE OF APPEAL
In Feagin v. State,159 the State challenged the defendant's notice of ap-
peal as not complying with Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 40(b)(1).
Originally, the defendant had pled guilty pursuant to a plea agreement
and received probation. A subsequent motion to revoke probation al-
leged that the defendant failed to report and failed to make monthly pay-
ments. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the State's motion to
revoke, arguing that the State failed to use due diligence in arresting her.
Following a hearing on the motion, the trial court denied the motion and
revoked the defendant's probation and sentenced her to imprisonment.
The defendant filed a general notice of appeal, and contended in the
court of appeals that her motion to dismiss was erroneously overruled.
The court of appeals agreed.
The State filed its petition for discretionary review, arguing that the
court of appeals incorrectly exercised jurisdiction over the defendant's
appeal because the defendant had failed to comply with Rule 40(b)(1)
requirements. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals held that the restric-
tions of Rule 40(b)(1) applied to appeals attacking the propriety of the
157. Carranza, 960 S.W.2d at 78.
158. Id. at 79.
159. 967 S.W.2d 417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
1999]
SMU LAW REVIEW
defendant's conviction and to the defendant's appeal of an order defer-
ring adjudication of guilt.160 However, Rule 40(b)(1) did not apply to
appeals attacking the propriety of orders revoking probation, and, thus,
the court of appeals properly exercised jurisdiction over the defendant's
appeal based upon the defendant's general notice of appeal.
XX. APPEAL
In Gomez v. State,16 1 the defendant argued that the inadvertent de-
struction of trial exhibits entitled him to a new trial under Rule 50(e).
The exhibits included food wrappers, soft drink cans, and a cigarette butt
which could not be reproduced. Expert testimony showed the defend-
ant's fingerprints on these exhibits. This evidence was uncontroverted.
The defendant's letter to the court reporter requested a statement of fact
in question-and-answer form and the exhibits. The defendant's designa-
tion of transcript to the clerk listed sixteen items but did not refer to the
exhibits. The court readdressed the problem previously discussed in
Melendez v. State,162 and emphasized that the original exhibits are only
part of the transcript and must be designated, or complaint is waived on
appeal. The court recognized that copies of exhibits and summary de-
scriptions of physical exhibits are only part of the statement of facts. As
the defendant failed to request the inclusion of the exhibits in the
designation filed with the clerk, the defendant could not complain that
the actual exhibits were missing from the record. In any event, the error
was harmless because the testimony concerning the recovery of the ex-
hibits and the defendant's fingerprints on the exhibits was not contested,
and the inclusion of these exhibits with the "latent fingerprints" would be
of no assistance to the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals in resolving the
grounds for review raised in the case because the court was not qualified
to interpret or compare the latent fingerprints.
In Hernandez v. State163 the defendant complained that the court of
appeals failed to review de novo whether his oral and written confessions
were involuntary. Citing Guzman v. State,164 for the proposition that an
appellate court may review de novo "mixed questions of law and fact"
under certain circumstances, the court remanded the case to the court of
appeals for reconsideration in light of Guzman.165
160. See Dillehey v. State, 815 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Whetstone v. State,
786 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
161. 962 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
162. 936 S.W.2d 287 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996).
163. 957 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
164. 955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
165. In Gutzman, the court stated:
(A)ppellate Courts, including this Court, should afford almost total defer-
ence to a trial court's determination of the historical facts that the record
supports especially when the trial courts fact findings are based on an evalua-
tion of credibility and demeanor. The appellate court's, including this Court,
should afford the same amount of deference to trial courts' rulings on "appli-
cations of law to fact questions," also known as "mixed questions of law and
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In Bell v. State,166 the defendant complained that when the court of
criminal appeals remanded the case to the court of appeals to address the
defendant's factual sufficiency claim, not previously addressed by the
court of appeals, that the court of appeals erred in failing to afford the
defendant an opportunity to file a brief after remand, relying upon Theus
v. State.167 The court distinguished Theus by observing that the defend-
ant had an opportunity and did, in fact, brief the factual sufficiency issue
in the initial brief on direct appeal, therefore no prejudice was visited
upon the defendant who would only have filed a carbon copy of the origi-
nal brief advancing the same arguments and addressing the same issues.
In State v. Mercado,168 the defendant filed a motion to suppress evi-
dence and initially established that he had standing in the premises to be
searched and that the search was conducted without a warrant. The bur-
den shifted to the State to establish an exception to the warrant require-
ment, and it only argued and presented facts to show that the search was
a proper inventory. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. On
appeal, the State for the first time argued the theory of search incident to
arrest and the court of appeals agreed.
The court ultimately held that the ordinary notions of procedural de-
fault should apply equally to the defendant and the State, and that in
cases in which the State is the party appealing, the basic principle of ap-
pellate jurisprudence "that points not argued at trial are deemed to be
waived applies equally to the State and the Defense." Thus, the judg-
ment of the court of appeals was reversed and the cause remanded.
In Wilson v. State,169 the defendant argued for the first time on appeal
that the trial judge lacked legal authority to preside at the trial because
his assignment had expired three days before the trial commenced. The
court observed that the statutory remedy of quo warranto was not avail-
able to a defendant, but only to the Attorney General or the County or
District Attorney; therefore, a defendant must object pre-trial and if he
fails to do so, he may not object subsequently or for the first time on
appeal.
XXI. POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF
HABEAS CORPUS
In Ex parte Kerr,170 the court dismissed an Application for Writ of
fact," if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor. The appellate courts may review de novo "mixed
questions of law and fact" not falling within this category.
Id. at 89.
166. 956 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
167. 863 S.W.2d 489, 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) (holding that, as a general rule, on
remand of a case from the court of criminal appeals to the court of appeals for harm
analysis, the court of appeals is required to afford the defendant an opportunity to file a
brief).
168. 972 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
169. 977 S.W.2d 379 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
170. 977 S.W.2d 585, 1998 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 26 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
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Habeas Corpus filed under Article 11.071 of the Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure. Judge Overstreet, in a dissenting opinion, expressed deep
concern that if the applicant was "executed as scheduled, this Court is
going to have blood on its hands for allowing it to go forward without
applicant being permitted to raise claims by Texas state habeas corpus
application." 171
Judge Overstreet severely criticized the counsel appointed by the court
of criminal appeals for the "perfunctory writ application" filed in this
cause which challenged the constitutionality of Article 11.071 without
challenging any other matter which occurred at trial, an approach which
certainly wrought a competency of counsel question as to the habeas at-
torney's assistance. Judge Overstreet observed that the habeas attorney
had filed an affidavit admitting that the application itself was filed in its
form because counsel "erroneously thought he was precluded from chal-
lenging the conviction/sentence trial proceedings while the direct appeal
was pending."' 172 Judge Overstreet concluded that the entire proceeding
was a charade which punished the applicant, rewarded the state, and
quite possibly encouraged other counsel to file such "perfunctory 'non-
applications.' "173
In Ex parte Martinez, 74 the court of criminal appeals again denied an
Application for Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.071
C.C.P. Judge Baird, in his dissenting opinion, opined that the merits of
the application should not be reached but, instead, the application should
be remanded to the trial court to address the issue of whether applicant
had received the effective assistance of counsel. Judge Baird wrote that
the application itself was only five-and-a-half pages long, raised four chal-
lenges to the conviction but did not quote the trial record, and only re-
ferred to three cases in four of the challenges. Apparently two of the
challenges comprised seventeen lines, or less than a page.
In Ex parte Wolfe,1 75 a majority of the court denied the Application for
Writ of Habeas Corpus filed pursuant to Article 11.071.176 The dissent
filed by Judge Baird observed that the applicant was represented by
counsel appointed by the court of criminal appeals and that the applica-
tion itself appeared "to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel, but
also includes a wish list of discovery, research, and hearings necessary to
represent applicant. 1 77 Judge Baird noted that no case authority was
cited. Judge Baird complained that the matter was not remanded to de-
termine whether the applicant had been afforded the effective assistance
of counsel on the habeas application as required by Article 11.071, Sec-
tion 2, which provides in part that every "applicant shall be represented
171. Id. at *4.
172. Id. at *2.
173. Id. at *3.
174. 977 S.W.2d 589 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
175. 977 S.W.2d 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).
176. The death penalty habeas corpus provision.
177. Wolfe, 977 S.W.2d 603
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by competent counsel" unless the applicant makes the election to do so
pro se.
In Ex parte Sowell,178 the defendant was convicted on his plea of guilty
of possession of cocaine and sentenced to 20 years incarceration. He did
not appeal this conviction. In this, his second habeas corpus attack on his
conviction filed pursuant to Article 11.07 C.C.P., he claimed that he was
not informed of his right to appeal from a pre-trial motion to suppress
evidence that had been ruled on prior to his entry of guilty plea. His
application tracked the statutory language of Article 11.07, Section 4
C.C.P., relevant to subsequent applications for Writ of Habeas Corpus.
The court held it did not have jurisdiction to consider this second applica-
tion because the application itself did not include sufficient specific facts
establishing an exception as required by the statutory provision.179
In addition, the court emphasized that allegations made in the first ap-
plication certainly indicated to the court the availability of this claim for
use at the time the first application was filed.
178. 956 S.W.2d 39 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
179. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.07, § 4 (Vernon Supp. 1997) in part reads:
(a) If a subsequent application for writ of habeas corpus is filed after final
disposition of an initial application challenging the same conviction, a court
may not consider the merits of or grant relief based on the subsequent appli-
cation unless the application contains sufficient specific facts establishing
that:
(1) the current claims and issues have not been and could not have been
presented previously in an original application or in a previously considered
application filed under this article because the factual or legal basis for the
claim was unavailable on the date the applicant filed the previous applica-
tion; or...
[2] (b) For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a legal basis of a claim is unavaila-
ble on or before a date described by Subsection (a)(1) if the legal basis was
not recognized by and could not have been reasonably formulated from a
final decision of the United States Supreme Court, a court of appeals of the
United States, or a court of appellate jurisdiction of this state on or before
that date.
(c) For purposes of Subsection (a)(1), a factual basis of a claim is unavailable
on or before a date described by subsection (a)(1) if the factual basis was not
ascertainable through the exercise of reasonable diligence on or before that
date.
1999]
970 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52
